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THE FCC's MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP RULES AND
NATIONAL CONCENTRATION IN THE
COMMERCIAL RADIO INDUSTRY *
MICHAEL 0. WIRTH, PH.D.**
INTRODUCTION
The [Federal Communication] Commission has traditionally
accorded this rule the highest station among its several multiple
ownership regulations. The "seven station" rule is the ultimate
multiple ownership regulation, with all other proscriptions and ex-
emptions occurring within the constraints it imposes. Since the
adoption of the "seven station" rule in 1953, the Commission has
never seen fit to waive this regulation, demonstrating the regard
held for the rule's integrity.'
From the moment the FCC first imposed an arbitrary upper limit on
the number of broadcasting stations that one business entity could own,2 the
Commission's multiple ownership regulation has been a source of contro-
versy. 3 Some authorities argue that the rule is too lenient and a more strin-
gent national concentration standard ought to be imposed.4 Others contend
the Rule is, at best, concerned with the wrong kind of ownership concentra-
tion, 5 and at worst, arbitrary and capricious. 6 Regardless of the point of
* The author gratefully acknowledges the funding support provided by the National
Association of Broadcasters toward the completion of this article.
** Assistant Professor of Mass Communications and Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Denver.
1. Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C. 2d 832, 834
(1977).
2. An upper limit of six FM stations to a customer was imposed in 1940. See 5 Fed. Reg.
2384 (1940). This was followed by imposing an upper limit of three on prospective television
owners. See 6 Fed. Reg. 2284 (1941). The television limit was increased to five in 1944. See 9
Fed. Reg. 5442 (1944). No formal rules existed for AM stations until the Commission promul-
gated the 7-7-7 Rule (7-7-5 at the time). See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C.
288 (1953). Prior to this an informal upper limit of seven AM stations existed as a result of the
FCC's refusal to allow CBS to purchase full interest in an eighth standard broadcast station,
KQW, in San Jose. See Sherwood B. Brunton, II F.C.C. 407 (1946).
3. See Howard, Muliple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. CoM. B.J. 1, 8
(1974) for a brief discussion of NBC's initial problems with the FCC's numeric limits on televi-
sion. See also Editorial, BROADCASTING Aug. 10, 1981 at 98. The most extensive and expensive
objection to the Seven Station Rule was lodged by Storer Broadcasting Co. (originally called
the Fort Industry Co.). Storer's challenge was turned back, however, by a nearly unanimous
Supreme Court decision favoring the FCC. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956).
4. See FCC Network Study Memorandum, Multiple Ownership and Television, 1 J. OF
BROADCASTING 250, 261 (1957); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
NETWORK BROADCASTING, H.R. REPORT No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 659-60 (1958). These
provide the FCC Network Study Staff's call for a long run FCC goal of one station per licensee.
See also H.R. REP. No. 607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1957).
5. See Trask, The Palace of Hunbug--A Study of FCC Policies Relating to Group Ownership of
Television Stattons, 22 FED. COM. B.J. 185, 210 (1968). See Rosse, Dertouzous, Robinson and
Wildman, Economic Issues in Mass Communicalton Industrtis, I FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRO-
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view, however, one thing is clear, the FCC has broad and substantial discre-
tion in fashioning ownership regulations.
7
The result of this extensive discretionary power is that the Commission's
ownership decisions are, in most instances, upheld by the courts.8 Conse-
quently, interested parties must influence Commission ownership policy at
its inception if they feel strongly about an issue.9 Failure to persuade the
FCC that a particular view ought to be the "reasonable" view adopted by
the Commission, leaves two options: 1) pressure Congress to amend the
Communications Act,10 or 2) wait until the political climate at the Commis-
sion becomes more favorable to the interest asserted.
As to the second strategy, the FCC's original Multiple Ownership Pro-
ceeding l ' provides a classic example. Ten parties (all broadcasters) filed
comments on September 27, 1948.12 The comments almost uniformly op-
posed the imposition of arbitrary numeric limits on station ownership by the
Commission. 13 The Commission ignored the arguments and instituted the
Seven Station Rule.' 4 Today, after nearly three decades of waiting, a de-
regulatory climate exists at the FCC.15 Commission Chairman, Mark Fowl-
er, recently suggested that it might be a good idea for the FCC to consider
the possibility of permitting groups to own more than seven AM radio sta-
tions, seven FM radio stations, and seven television stations [TV].
16
This article will focus on the radio portion of the policy question raised
CEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION 40, 188 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Rosse].
6. See Brief for Respondent at 25-26, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent]; Comments of National Broadcasting Co.
Pursuant to the Federal Communications Commission Multiple Ownership Proceedings in
Docket No. 8967 at 18, 20 (Sept. 27, 1948); Comments of the Trans-American Television Corpo-
ration On Proposal to Amend the Multiple Ownership Rules in Docket No. 8967 at 27, 43-44
(Sept. 27, 1948).
7. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 192 (1943); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978).
8. According to Powe, FCC Determinations of Networking Issues in Multiple Ownership
Proceedings, 3 Federal Commumiations Commision Network Inquiy pecta/ Staf 1, 19 (1980),
"[wjhatever may be the outer limit of the Commission's authority, there is no indication in the
three cases that the Commission has approached it." Cf. United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649 (1972).
9. Subsequent court review will be totally unsuccessful unless the Commission has uti-
lized an "unreasonable" means of promoting diversity of mass communications sources. FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978); Powe, supra note 8 at 19.
10. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-744 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. The reference here is to the FCC's initiation of formal rulemaking, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 13 Fed. Reg. 5060 (1948).
12. Review of Original FCC Docket No. 8967 (Aug. 6, 1981) (available in National
Archives, Suitland, Md.).
13. Id.
14. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). The industry's argu-
ments although largely ineffective did cause the Commission to increase the number of FM
stations that one party could own (from six to seven) and ultimately got the television station
limit raised to seven (only five of which could be VHF) in a subsequent proceeding; see Report
and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954).
15. The FCC has moved recently to deregulate cable television, some aspects of radio, and
license renewal procedures for radio and TV.
16. FCC OK's Westinghouse-Teleprompter, BROADCASTING Aug. 3, 1981 at 29-30.
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by Mr. Fowler's suggestion.1 7 The issue of whether the FCC's Seven Station
Rule should be retained to control national concentration in radio will be
addressed. First, a brief history of the Seven Station Rule will be provided.
Next, the FCC's rationale for promulgating the Rule will be discussed, and
the status of radio group ownership with respect to national concentration
issues will be described. The next section will contain a list of policy alterna-
tives which FCC policymakers can consider. The alternatives will be criti-
cally evaluated, including the author's policy recommendations and
conclusions.
I. HISTORY OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE
The first formal rule promulgated by the FCC limiting the number of
commercial stations that could be owned by one entity restricted FM sta-
tion-ownership to six stations.' 8 This 1940 rule was instituted at a time
when there were fewer than fifty FM stations on the air.19 Shortly thereafter
(April 30, 1941), the FCC issued a rule which limited national television
ownership to three stations.20 This TV limit was later increased to five in
May 1944 as a partial response to an NBC petition requesting that the upper
limit be set at seven television stations.
2 1
No formal maximum limit on AM station ownership was imposed by
the Commission prior to its decision in Docket 8967.22 However, the FCC's
decision in Sherwood B. Brunton23 made clear the Commission's opinion that
full ownership of more than seven AM stations nationally is not in the public
interest, at least with respect to a powerful national radio network.
On August 19, 1948, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making
which recommended that a financial entity be limited to ownership of seven
AM stations, six FM stations, and five television stations.2 4 The rule making
was completed on November 27, 1953, when the Commission issued a Report
and Order limiting ownership to seven AM stations, seven FM stations, and
five TVs. 25 The final modification to the FCC-established arbitrary upper
17. Much of the discussion is applicable to a discussion of national concentration in the
television industry. However, the obvious differences between these two industries (7,937 li-
censed commercial radio stations on the air versus 763 TV stations) suggests that they ought to
be separated analytically.
18. 5 Fed. Reg. 2384 (1940). According to Howard, supra note 3, at 8, the FM standard
was contained in Rule 3.228 (now codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.240 (1981)).
19. Comments of Trans-American Television, supra note 6, at 3.
20. 6 Fed. Reg. 2284 (1941). According to Howard, supra note 3, at 8, the TV standard
was originally issued as Rule 4.77 in 1940 and was applicable to experimental television sta-
tions. Rule 4.77 was replaced by Rule 4.226 (now codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1981)) when
the FCC allowed experimental stations to switch to commercial operation in 1941.
21. 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (1942). According to Powe, supra note 8, at 28, there were only five
commercial television stations in operation when NBC made its request.
22. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
23. 11 F.C.C. 407, 412-13 (1946). At the time, CBS already had controlling interest in
seven AM stations, six of which were 50,000 watt clear channel stations. Since KQW in San
Jose was also a 50,000 watt clear channel station, the FCC's decision in this case would not
necessarily have prevented a less powerful entity with a less powerful station lineup from ob-
taining an eighth station.
24. See supra note 11.
25. Seesupra note 22. The Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) also
dealt with the extent of ownership interest which would activate imposition of the promulgated
1982]
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limits on national station ownership took place in September 1954, when the
Commission increased the television limit to seven (provided that only five
were VHFs).
2 6
II. THE FCC's RATIONALE FOR THE SEVEN STATION RULE
The Seven Station Rule was established at a time when the communi-
cations industry was experiencing rapid change. The television industry was
just becoming a meaningful nationwide force.27 Conversely, the radio in-
dustry was on the verge of losing most of its national influence. 28 Larger
broadcast interests were uniformly opposed to the rule's limitations. 29 Very
little was heard or written concerning the position taken by smaller broad-
casters, 30 and Congressional sentiment was mixed.
3
In light of the countervailing forces present in the regulatory environ-
ment, the FCC attempted to effect a "reasonable" compromise with respect
to the Seven Station proceeding. 32 The policy objective underlying the
Commission's decision was to maximize nationwide broadcast competition
(the number of different owners) while minimizing industry disruption.
3 3
limits. Although these limits were set at a low level (one percent), they are outside the concern
of this article. The rules as promulgated and as subsequently modified can be found in 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), 73.240 (FM), and 73.636 (TV) (1981).
26. Report and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954). This does not suggest
that the FCC has been inactive with respect to its concern over concentration of broadcast
media. Numerous proceedings have dealt with issues concerning regional and local media con-
centration. However, with the exception of the FCC's attempt to institute a Top 50 Ownership
Rule, 45 F.C.C.2d 1851 (1964) and in Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 16068
(June 21, 1965), no formal action has been taken with respect to the Seven Station Rule.
27. The FCC's issuance of its Sixth Report and Order in Docket No. 8736, 41 F.C.C. 148
(1952), ended the freeze on new TV station construction effective July 1, 1952. Howard, supra
note 3, at 9, indicates that the Seven Station Rule was promulgated at a time of great activity in
the expansion of broadcasting. According to Sterling, Television and Radz Broadcastiig, WHO
OWNS THE MEDIA? 80 (1979), 108 television stations were on the air when the freeze was lifted.
By 1956 there were 441 television stations in operation.
28. See E. BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB 288-90 (1968) for a discussion of television's im-
pact on radio ratings. As of December 1953 there were 2,495 licensed AM stations on the air
and 537 licensed FM stations. These totals represent growth rates of 35% and 171% respectively
from 1948 when the FCC first proposed the Seven Station Rule.
29. See supra note 6.
30. The only evidence in Docket No. 8967 suggesting that small broadcasters might have
favored the Rule was a letter from E. B. Craney of Pacific Northwest Broadcasters. Docket No.
8967, 5 (Aug. 31, 1948). In Craney's view two Class IA's in the hands of one individual tends
toward monopoly; one Class IA in the hands of a national network tends toward monopoly; and
that if the FCC planned a limitation with respect to the number of stations the best way is to
license one station to each applicant.
31. See Senator Johnson Blasts FCC Seven- TV-Limit Proposal, BROADCASTING Jan. 18, 1954 at
31. See also 93 CONG. REC. 5586, in which Senator White suggests that concentration of control
limitations should be decided by Congress rather than the FCC. Section 19 of S. 1333 (1948)
provided that no persons under common control shall own or control stations in the same
broadcast band which serves more than 25% of the population. This wording was dropped by
the time the bill was reported out of committee on June 9, 1948.
32. This author's operational definition of a "reasonable" compromise is that all of the
parties interested in the outcome get something, but none get everything they wanted. This
approach normally results in a decision which will be upheld on appeal.
33. This objective is not explicitly stated in the Commission's decision in Report and Or-
der in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). The clearest support for this view is contained in
Brief for Petitioners at 41-42, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners]. The policy objective which the FCC followed in this
[Vol. 60:1
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The FCC's reasons for promulgating arbitrary numeric limitations fall into
two categories: 1) fulfillment of agency responsibilities as outlined by statute
and interpreted by case law, and 2) specific reasons for choosing the numeric
limitations contained in the Order.
3 4
A. Fulfillment of Agency Responsibilties
The Seven Station Rule was "designed to implement the Congressional
policy against monopoly."
35
One of the basic underlying considerations in the enactment
of the Communications Act was the desire to effectuate the policy
against the monopolization of broadcast facilities and the preserva-
tion of our broadcast system on a free competitive basis. See Federal
Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
This Commission has consistently adhered to the principle of "di-
versification" in order to implement the Congressional policy
against monopoly and in order to preserve competition. That prin-
ciple requires a limitation on the number of broadcast stations
which may be licensed to any one person or persons under common
control. It is our view that the operation of broadcast stations by a
large group of diversified licensees will better serve the public inter-
est than the operation of broadcast stations by a small and limited
group of licensees.
36
The FCC was careful to explain that it was not attempting to enforce the
antitrust laws through the Seven Station Rule.3 7 Rather, it stressed that
"the fundamental purpose [of the rules] is to promote diversification of own-
ership in order to maximize diversification of program and service view-
points as well as to prevent any undue concentration of economic power
contrary to the public interest."
'38
decision is consistent with the theory of FCC behavior forwarded by R. NOLL, M. PECK & J.
McGoWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 120-21 (1973). They contend
that "[g]iven the information available to them, the commissioners attempt through their deci-
sions to maximize some objective function, including the welfare of the commissioners as indi-
viduals and of groups affected by their decisions, and the survival and growth of the regulatory
agency." Id.
34. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
35. Id. at 291. The Commission pointed to sections 311 and 313 of the Communications
Act for specific authorization. Id. at 290.
36. Id. at 291. Further support for the FCC's position is provided in FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940). Congress was gravely concerned that, absent an
assertion of governmental control, "the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic
domination in the broadcasting field." See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945). Competition in the presentation of viewpoints, no less than competition in the economic
sense, is vital, for "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources is essential to the welfare of the public ... ." d.
37. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 290 (1953). The Communi-
cations Act of 1934 does not empower the Commission to enforce the antitrust laws. Every time
the Commission has dealt with communication ownership issues, the affected industry bases
part of its case on this fact. However, from Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) to the present (see supra cases cited in note 7), the courts have made it abundantly
clear that the FCC's powers in this area go far beyond those contained in the antitrust laws.
38. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 290, 291 (1953).
1982]
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B. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.
The Report and Order in Docket 8967 provided the general philosophy
underlying the FCC's Seven Station Rule. However, additional insight into
the FCC's rationale for promulgating the Rule was provided when Storer
Broadcasting challenged the Seven Station Rule in court. 39 The brief filed
on behalf of the Commission in the United States Supreme Court
4
0
presented a number of additional arguments in support of the contention
that the Seven Station Rule was "reasonable." The Commission advanced
the traditional rationale for regulation of broadcasting--scarcity of available
channels4 t-to support the need for an upper limit on the number of sta-
tions that any one entity could own.42 Another familiar theme-the media
power rationale for regulation-was also used to justify the rules.
Moreover, since the formation of public opinion is important
on the national, as well as on the local level, effective diversification
cannot be achieved merely by assuring that there will be some
competition in each region. To permit the growth of large chains,
however, the component stations might happen to be distributed,
would be to invite a creeping trend to uniformity.
43
The Commission further argued that the Rule would protect small, in-
dependent broadcasters from the bargaining advantages possessed by chain
broadcasters, 44 and that the Commission's primary statutory rationale for
promulgating the Rule was to assure "the larger and more effective use of
radio." '45 Additional reasons cited by the FCC for upholding the Seven Sta-
tion Rule were that the rules rests on the informed judgment of years of
agency experience 46 and is eminently reasonable,4 7 that a trend toward
heavy concentration is antithetical to the maximum utilization of radio facil-
ities and contrary to the public interest,48 and that promulgation of a multi-
ple ownership rule is a fairer, more efficient procedure than an ad hoc
approach to the issue.
49
C. Why the Commission Chose A Limit of Seven
The vagueness of the record presenting the FCC's rationale for selecting
specific numeric limitations on ownership is in sharp contrast to the specific-
39. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 220 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aJ'd, 351
U.S. 192 (1956).
40. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33 at 12.
41. See B. OWEN, EcONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 103 (1975).
42. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 12.
43. d. at 13.
44. d. This view provides a fuller understanding of what the FCC meant by preventing
"any undue concentration of economic power contrary to the public interest." See Report and
Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 30 3 (g). This section also was used to support the FCC's Chain Broadcast-
ing Regulations in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
46. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 14.
47. Id. The FCC made it clear in this portion of its brief that Storer had the burden of
demonstrating that the Seven Station Rule was unreasonable, and that Storer had failed to do
SO.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 36-37.
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ity of the regulatory philosophy portions just discussed. The FCC selected
the number seven in the case of AM stations "in order that present holdings
of such stations be not unduly disrupted." 50 In addition, the seven station
limit "is consistent with the historical development of AM broadcasting and
the tremendous expansion that has been achieved" within that framework. 5 1
In the case of FM stations, the number seven was selected because "[i]t is
considered desirable to have the same limitation applicable to both aural
services because of their inter-relationship and the present status of FM's
growth."'52 Finally, the number five was continued in effect for television
because the Commission indicated that "based on extensive experience with
the problems of multiple ownership, [the limitations] have proven practica-
ble and desirable.
' 5 3
III. THE STATUS OF GROUP OWNERSHIP IN RADIO
Past studies of broadcast group ownership have primarily focused on
television, with little research of radio. Because radio group ownership has
received so little attention, this section will briefly review past empirical at-
tempts to identify the impact that group ownership has had on various
measures of television performance, and the economic reasons for being en-
gaged in radio group ownership. Summary data regarding the extent of ra-
dio group ownership over time will be presented.
A. Review of TV Studies
A number of studies have been conducted that partially assess the im-
pact of television group ownership on station performance. The results of
the studies are not conclusive when applied to group ownership in radio.
However, because they provide the only empirical evidence available with
respect to group-owned broadcast station behavior, a review is in order.
The evidence regarding group ownership in television suggests that it
has had minimal impact on station profitability5 4 or station rates.55 Such
50. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295 (1953).
51. Id. at 295. Cohn, Proceedings of the Symposium on Media Concentration, I FTC 203 (1978),
indicates that the number seven was selected while he was at the Commission in the early 1940's
on the theory that anyone who controlled more than one percent of the AM stations on the air
would be a monopolist. See also Magic Number, BROADCASTING Aug. 31, 1981 at 16. The FCC's
chief staff architect of the Seven Station Rule, Arthur Scheiner, disagrees with Cohn. He states
that the Seven Station Rule limits "were not intended to represent any given percentage of
existing stations." See Ownership Background, BROADCASTING Sept. 14, 1981 at 23.
52. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295 (1953).
53. Id. at 294.
54. P. CHERINGTON, L. HIRSCH, & R. BRANDWEIN, TELEVISION STATION OWNERSHIP: A
CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATION (1970); Boyer & Wirth, The Economics of Regula-
tion by Poliy Directive: FCC Public Interest Requirements, 21 Q. REV. OF ECON. AND Bus. 77, 90
(198 1); Levin, Compeion, Dwersity, and the Television Group Ownership Rule, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
791, 799, 810 (1970). The Boyer and Wirth study suggests that group owners, as compared with
nongroup owners, behave in a way which indicates they believe FCC license renewal criteria are
relatively insensitive to the quantities of public interest programming. Since this should lead
group-owned stations to offer slightly less public interest programming than stations without
such ownership ties, it should also lead to somewhat larger profits for group-owned TV stations,
other things being equal. See also Bortz, Wirth, & Pottle, The Economics of Televistin Saion Opera-
tion in l00-Plus Markets 94 (Feb. 1981) (for National Association of Broadcasters).
19821
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ownership had a mixed impact on the quantity of public interest program-
ming that was broadcast, 56 and a positive impact on market level income
and revenue. 5 7 The empirical case against group ownership in the more
highly concentrated television industry is not a persuasive one.58 In radio,
anticompetitive behavior resulting from group ownership is even less likely
to occur due to the much larger number of operating stations.5 9 In conclu-
sion, the empirical evidence suggests that at current levels group ownership
in television (and by analogy, radio) has not resulted in anticompetitive sta-
tion behavior.
6 °
B. The Economics of Radio Group Ownership
Entrepreneurs who purchase and operate multiple radio stations would
have an economic incentive to do so if group ownership resulted in econo-
mies of scale from reduced costs of purchasing, selling, investing, production,
and/or management;
6 ' if radio station ownership were highly profitable;
62
or if group ownership in radio provided significantly greater market power
relative to nongroup-owned stations.
6 3
Based on the present levels of radio group ownership, an entrepreneur
could expect the economies of scale to be quite small. 64 This is partially due
to the fact that radio program costs are considerably lower than are televi-
55. Both P. CHERINGTON, L. HIRSCH, & R. BRANDWEIN, supra note 54, and Wirth & Wol-
lert, The Effects of Market Structure on Television News Pricing (Aug. 1981) (paper presented
at Annual Convention of Association for Educators in Journalism) support this notion.
56. See Boyer & Wirth, supra note 54, at 90; Litman, Public Interest Programming and the Carroll
Doctrite: A Re-Examination, 23 J. OF BROADCASTING 51, 58 (1979), for evidence suggesting that
group-owned TV stations offer somewhat less public interest programming than do non-group
owned TV stations. Evidence supporting the opposite view can be found in Wirth & Wollert,
Public Interest Programming: Taxation by Regulation, 23 J. OF BROADCASTING 319, 324 (1979);
Wirth & Wollert, Public Interest Programming: FCC Standards and Station Performance, 55 JOURNAL-
ISM Q. 554, 560 (1978).
57. Levin, Research Memorandum on the Economic and Programming Efects of Newspaper Ownership
of Televirion Stations, Supplementary Comments in Docket No. 18110 (May 1974).
58. See Media Concentration. Hearing before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Minority Enter-
prise of the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 426 (1980) (Part 1) (statement of
John F. Lyons) [hereinafter cited as Meda Concentration].
59. Id. at 417.
60. Id. On the other hand, depending on one's political perspective, the evidence that
group ownership has very little effect on station performance could be used to demonstrate that
allowing group ownership does not result in positive social benefits. This could then be used to
argue that because there are no public interest advantages to be derived from group ownership,
there is no reason to allow it. Clearly, the party who has the burden of proof in the above
situation will lose.
61. Id. at 425-26. See also C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 208-09
(1975).
62. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 425.
63. Id. at 424. Possession of such market power would allow a group owner to behave
anticompetitively by engaging in a scheme of predatory pricing to drive competitors out of
individual markets. Group ownership would have to result in excess profits, for the group as a
whole, for this to occur. This would allow a group owner to subsidize predatory (intentionally
lower) prices in one market with excess profits from another. Id.
64. It is possible that significant economies could be achieved by owning a larger number
of stations than is presently allowed. With all of the recent movement to expand the number of
national radio networks particularly via satellite distribution, there might be a cost-based incen-
tive for radio networks to expand their ownership of stations if the seven station limit is lifted.
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sion program costs. 6 5 Although no evidence exists in this area, it is arguable
that some economies should occur with respect to sales and investment for
group-owned stations. However, these economies could not be expected to
result in much higher returns on investment.
66
In addition, profitability will not provide much incentive to operate
multiple radio stations since the evidence suggests that radio stations in gen-
eral are only earning normal economic profits.67 In 1979 the average radio
station which reported to the FCC earned gross revenues of $424,421, which
resulted in earnings before taxes of only $30,160.68 Consequently, the aver-
age radio station had a 1979 pretax profit margin of only 7.1%.69 The FCC's
figures also indicated that approximately forty percent of the radio stations
from which the Commission received financial data were losing money in
1979.
Finally, it does not appear likely that group-owned radio stations in
general possess much market power. 70 No evidence exists which would indi-
cate that radio station groups have ever used market power to engage in
predatory pricing. 7 1 Inasmuch as the average radio station in this country
faces tremendous competition, not only from other radio stations, but also
from television stations and daily newspapers, a market power incentive to
form radio groups does not appear to exist.
72
C. The Extent of Radio Group Ownership
Group ownership in radio can be analyzed as an increasing trend, or
conversely, as limited and level growth. Table 1 indicates that both the
number of group-owned radio stations and the percentage of all stations
which are group-owned have increased over time. For example, in 1953
when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, 423 of the 3,032 licensed
commercial radio stations on the air were group-owned. In 1980, 2,124 of
the 7,839 commercial stations on the air were group-owned. During this
twenty-seven-year period, the percentage of stations that are owned in
groups of three or more rose from 14% to 27. 1%, which is an average annual
65. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 438.
66. Id. at 427.
67. B. OwEN, supra note 41, at 122, suggests that radio is the most competitive form of mass
media other than magazines. Radio is considered to be monopolistically competitive. Monopo-
listically competitive firms do not earn long run economic (excess) profits. See also Martin, Com-
petition in the Broadcasting Indstiy." A Status Report 38-44 (June 1981) (report prepared for
National Association of Broadcasters).
68. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1979 Radio Revenue Data.
69. Radio stations had a much better year in 1978 when the average station earned a
pretax profit margin of 11.6%. However, investors looking for high-yield investment opportuni-
ties would not be likely to invest in the average commercial radio station. This is not to say that
there are not stations which earn much higher returns than average. It appears, however, that a
profit-based rationale for the formation of radio groups is not very strong.
70. See supra note 67.
71. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 424-25.
72. The economics of the radio industry are considerably different from those of the televi-
sion industry. The costs of owning and operating a radio station are much lower than those of a
television station. This fact coupled with the much larger number of frequencies available in
radio has resulted in extensive competition for radio broadcasters in all but the smallest mar-
kets. Id. at 417.
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increase in group-owned radio stations of .49%.73
TABLE 174
RADIO GROUP OWNERSHIP: 1929-1980
No. of Percent of
Total Total No. of Group- Avg. No. of Stations Under
No. of No. of Group Owned Stations Group
Year AMs FMs Owners Stations Owned/Group Ownership
1929 600 - 12 20 1.7 3.3%
1939 764 - 39 109 2.8 14.3%
1951 2,295 558 63 253 4.0 8.9%
1953" 2,495 537 88 423 4.8 , 14.0%
1960* 3,483 732 185 765 4.1 18.1%
1970* 4,304 2,145 250 1,432 5.7 22.2%
1978* 4,498 3,010 324 1,906 5.9 25.4%
1980* 4,572 3,267 360 2,124 5.9 27.1%
*Only groups which owned three or more radio stations are included for these years because this
is the BROADCASTING YEARBOOK definition of radio group ownership.
Another way to assess the extent of radio group ownership is to identify
the average number of stations controlled per group entity over time. The
data provided in Table 1 reveals a positive trend which has been level since
1970. Specifically, the number of radio stations controlled by the average
group owner in 1953 was 4.8. By 1980 this figure had risen to 5.9 stations. 75
Because the FCC's Seven Station Rule allows for ownership of up to four-
teen radio stations, the 1980 figure indicates that the average group owner
controls only 42.1% of the legally permissible number of radio stations.
A final method by which to examine radio group ownership trends is to
identify how many entities control various combinations of AM and FM
stations. Tables 2 through 5 provide insight into the mix of AM-FM group
ownership combinations over time. Only three entities control the maxi-
mum number of radio stations allowed under the Seven Station Rule. This
has been true since at least 1970 (Table 3). Forty-six of the 360 group enti-
ties in 1980 controlled ten or more stations (Table 5). The larger groups
controlled a total of 531 radio stations or 6.8% of all the commercial radio
stations on the air.
76
73. If the number of radio stations on the air remained fixed at the 1980 level, and group
ownership continued to increase at this pace, it would take 149 years for all of the commercial
radio stations in the United States to come under some form of group control.
74. The sources for Table I are: C. STERLING & T. HAIGHT, THE MASS MEDIA Table
260c (1978); BROADCASTING (various dates); BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (various dates); Media
Concentration." Hearing before the Subcomm. on General Ooerszght and Minority Enterprtse of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1980) (Part 1) (statement of John F. Lyons)
[hereinafter cited as Media Concentration Hearing].
75. An increase in the average number of stations controlled by each group is understanda-
ble. In 1953 there was not much interest in owning FM stations due to low profitability. Conse-
quently, radio broadcasters interested in making a profit were able to own only seven
potentially profitable AM stations. As more people started listening to FM stations, owners
became more interested in owning FMs. A group owner could then own 14 stations potentially
capable of earning a profit. This fact alone could cause the increase evidenced in Table 1.
76. In 1978, 36 entities owned 10 or more stations. This represented 409 stations or 5.4% of
all the stations in operation. See Media Concentration supra note 58, at 419.
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The data provided relative to radio group ownership suggest that the
radio industry is essentially unconcentrated at the national level. Nearly sev-
enty-three percent of this country's radio stations are individually owned,




ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1953
Number of AM Stations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total # FM
Number 0 29 15 10 3 2 59 0
1 0 5 5 1 1 0 12 12
of 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 6 12
3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 4 12
FM 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 8
5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 15
Stations 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 12
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 0 40 22 14 6 5 88 71
# AM 0 0 0 120 88 70 36 38* 352
*CBS owned nine AMs and J. Elroy McCaw controlled eight prior to the FCC's
adoption of the Seven Station Rule.
77. The extent of national radio concentration that exists has undoubtedly been influenced
by the FCC's Seven Station Rule. At present, no one entity can own more than .18% of the
operational commercial radio stations. Some upward movement in radio's concentration pic-
ture would probably take place if the Commission increased the number of stations that could
be owned by any one entity. Whether such increases in group ownership would result in an-
ticompetitive behavior or the potential for such activity on either the information or the adver-
tising side of the national media market is of course germane to the policy question being
explored in this article.
78. Table 2 was derived from BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (1954). Figures in the main
body of the table represent the number of entities owning that combination of AM and FM
radio stations. For instance, in 1953 there were 29 entities which owned three AMs and zero
FMs. Total rows and columns give the number of entities owning a certain number of AM or
FM stations. In 1953, there were 40 entities which owned three AMs and between zero and
seven FMs. Adding these columns or rows gives the total number of entities owning three or
more radio stations in that year. In 1953 there were 88 such entities. Rows marked AM and
columns marked FM give the number of AM or FM stations owned by those entities. The total




ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1970
Number of AM Stations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total # FM
Number 0 29 14 2 6 7 51 0
1 15 23 14 4 5 1 62 62
of 2 5 19 18 10 4 2 2 60 120
3 1 0 0 15 9 5 6 4 40 120
FM 4 0 0 0 1 4 4 4 1 14 56
5 1 0 0 0 1 6 2 2 12 60
Stations 6 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 8 60
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 21
Total 3 5 34 86 54 25 28 15 250 487
# AM 0 5 68 258 216 125 168 105 945
TABLE 480
ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1978
Number of AM Stations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total # FM
Number 0 10 4 2 1 0 17 0
1 50 17 7 2 0 0 76 76
of 2 16 28 25 13 3 2 2 89 178
3 1 4 7 30 19 3 2 1 67 201
FM 4 0 1 0 3 15 10 4 0 33 132
5 2 0 0 4 1 6 4 0 17 85
Stations 6 3 0 1 0 0 4 6 2 16 96
7 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 9 63
Total 6 21 86 90 60 32 21 8 324 831
# AM 0 21 172 270 240 160 156 56 1075
79. The source of Table 3 was Media Concentratzon Hearings, supra note 74, at 418.
80. Table 4 was derived from Media Concentration Hearings, supra note 74, at 418.
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TABLE 581
ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1980
Number of AM Stations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total # FM
Number 0 12 4 1 1 0 18 0
1 47 18 5 2 1 0 73 73
of 2 18 42 23 12 3 2 0 100 200
3 3 4 14 25 18 2 2 0 68 204
FM 4 0 0 7 6 22 8 5 1 49 196
5 2 1 1 5 2 7 6 2 26 130
Stations 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 3 13 78
7 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 3 13 91
Total 5 24 111 90 65 25 31 9 360 972
# AM 0 26 222 270 260 125 186 63 1152
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR RETENTION OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE
The past position of the FCC regarding the promulgation and retention
of the Seven Station Rule has already been discussed in detail. The argu-
ments posed by other proponents of retention or expansion of the present
rule will be summarized in the remainder of this section.
A. Position of the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 
82
upheld the Commission's statutory authority to establish the Seven Station
Rule.
Congress sought to create regulation for public protection
with careful provision to assure fair opportunity for open competi-
tion in the use of broadcasting facilities. . . . It is but a rule that
announces the Commission's attitude on public protection against
such concentration. . . . The growing complexity of our economy
induced the Congress to place regulation of businesses-like commu-
nication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are
slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with stat-
utory directions. We think the Multiple Ownership Rules, as
adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications Act as a
whole.
8 3
However, the Court did not attempt to evaluate the merits of the specific
station limitations selected by the Commission.
8 4
81. The source for Table 5 was BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK (1981).
82. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
83. Id. at 203.
84. Typically, the courts do not engage in such evaluation. Instead, the courts review
Commission decisions to determine if they are "reasonable." If such decisions are deemed to be
reasonable, they will be upheld. The party appealing a Commission decision has the burden of
demonstrating the unreasonableness of the decision. In this situation, the courts (particularly
the Supreme Court) normally defer to the expertise of the Commission in deciding what is
reasonable. Se general#5, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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B. Positron of Congress
Congress has been fearful of "monopoly" in the communications indus-
try from the industry's inception. 85 Past sentiment appears to have fallen on
the side of tightening the multiple ownership rules rather than liberalizing
them.
8 6
Senator Magnuson, for example, stated he was afraid that if Congress
failed to act or if the FCC did not institute anti-monopoly ownership rules,
the radio industry would become concentrated in a manner similar to the
newspaper industry.
I think it is wise that this Congress do what it can to prevent in the
future any such thing . . . [a]lthough now in most communities
where there are six stations there are probably six owners, as com-
petition continues and some stations get bad, one man will start to
buy them up. There are two or three people in the country starting
to buy up radio stations, and then pretty soon we will get into the
same monopolistic situation in a geographical area that now exists
in the newspaper field.
8 7
Nine years later Senator Bricker proposed to abolish the FCC's Seven
Station Rule, not because he was opposed to the principles underlying the
FCC's regulation but because he argued it was desirable to substitute "for
such sterile abstraction, a realistic and workable public interest criterion of
maximum coverage or service to 25% of the country's population."8 8
The argument that the rule should be made more stringent was ex-
pressed by Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, who said that the FCC may have sanctioned
excessive concentration in the broadcasting industry.8 9
Multiple ownership of broadcasting stations by a single interest
. . .leads to concentration, militates against the national objective
of diversity of program sources, and lends itself to anticompetitive
abuses. Network affiliation agreements examined by the Antitrust
Subcommittee reveal that multiple-station owners often derive sub-
stantial advantages over sole-station owners in compensation and
other terms, making it difficult for sole-station owners to compete
effectively with owners of several stations.9
°
Ultimately, Congressman Celler's Committee failed to recommend any
85. See supra note 36. See also Warner, Monopoy and Monopolistc Prattces and the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 6 FED. COMM. B.J. 26, 26-35, 55-60 (1941).
86. The majority of Congressional sentiment that was expressed in hearings during the
1940's and 1950's suggests too much concentration existed in the communications industry
under the Seven Station Rule. The primary Congressional proposal to "make a better mouse-
trap" was to restrict ownership to coverage of 25% of the U.S. population. See Sen. Bricker's
proposal in S. 3859, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CONG. REc. 8210 (1956); Sen. White's proposal in
S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 5586 (1947).
87. Hearings on S 1333 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S 1333].
88. Bricker Lowers the Boom on CBS, NBC "Domination", BROADCASTING Apr. 30,1956 at 29.
Sen. Bricker's bill, S. 3859, supra note 86, never became law.
89. See Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting Industr, 22 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 539, 549 (1957). Celler stated that the Seven Station Rule was contrary to antitrust
principles because it sanctioned excessive concentration in the broadcast industry.
90. Id. at 561.
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changes in the FCC's Multiple Ownership Rules, but the Committee indi-
cated that the Commission should give "antitrust.and other factors emphatic
consideration" in any multiple ownership rule changes.91 Chairman Celler
concluded that "if anything, [the Seven Station Rule should] be rendered
more stringent; it should not be relaxed."
92
C. Position of the Justice Department
The United States Department of justice has generally supported reten-
tion of the Seven Station Rule. One of its earliest pronouncements concern-
ing the rule was made by Victor Hansen, Chief of the Antitrust Division in
1956. Hansen stated that an eradication of the numerical limitation may
increase the trend toward concentration, which he considered undesirable in
either networks or single individuals.
The Commission deplored the trend toward concentration of
ownership and control of radio stations. The same trend has been
observed with respect to television. Ownership of a large number
of [television] stations by a single interest raises real antitrust
problems. Such owners would be in a position to [capitalize] on
mass purchasing power and by combining their outlets in single-
station markets with their outlets in multiple-station markets. We
have received complaints that these tactics have already been em-
ployed by multistation owners who obtain preferences in network
affiliations over single-station owners. . . . [T]he multiple-owner-
ship rule should be, if anything, tightened, not relaxed.
93
The Antitrust Division's support for the Seven Station Rule is under-
standable because the rule establishes limits on ownership, thus alleviating
nationwide concerns about "bigness." Donald Baker, formerly with the An-
titrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, has indicated
that the antitrust laws "have to be brought to bear on actual market situa-
tions" to be effective. 94 Even though the Seven Station Rule could not be
enforced under the antitrust laws, Baker suggests that it is an appropriate
rule because "in special circumstances [it is desirable] to have some other
public policies that are concerned with bigness without regard to proof of
economic effect." '95
D. FCC's Network Broadcasting Stud
One of the most controversial reports to come out in the 1950's was the
FCC's study of network broadcasting, 96 which was supervised by Dean Ros-
91. See REPORT ON THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, ANTITRUST SUBCOMM.
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1957).
92. See Celler, supra note 89, at 561.
93. Hearings on Television Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on theJudiciy, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4122-23 (1956).
94. Baker, Uses and Abuses of Antitrust Principles in Dealing with Media Concentration Questions,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION, 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION 649, 651 (1978).
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Network Broadcasting, REPORT OF THE NETWORK STUDY STAFF OF THE NETWORK
STUDY COMMITTEE, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (1957).
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coe Barrow, director of the FCC Study Staff. The study's conclusions were
not favorable to multiple ownership in television.
9 7
The trend in multiple ownership indicates that in the future
there will be substantial problems of undue concentration of con-
trol, in the absence of limitations imposed by the Commission...
as multiple ownership increases, single-station ownership decreases.
The single-station owner is at a bargaining disadvantage and may
not be able to compete effectively with multiple owners. . . . It is
possible that the broadcasting industry will become a multiple-unit
industry and the character of a television station as a community
institution will be lost. .... 98
The network study staff argued that strict limits on multiple ownership sub-
stantially lessened the opportunity for a multiple-station TV licensee to im-
pose potentially illegal tie-in arrangements. Examples of such arrangements
include a multiple-station licensee who 1) refuses to sell time on one of his
stations to a national spot advertiser unless time is sold for all of his stations;
2) refuses to clear some of his stations for a network program unless the na-
tional advertiser purchases times on all of his stations; or 3) refuses to
purchase film from a syndicator for all or several of his stations unless given a
highly favorable pricing arrangement. 99 Obviously, Dean Barrow's position
is that multiple ownership leads to anticompetitive behavior in the television
industry and that it runs counter to the FCC's notions of local station owner-
ship and operation.100 In 1957, when the Report was released, Dean Barrow
argued that the best course for the Commission to take was further limita-
tion, rather than relaxation, of the existing rules. 0 1
The report did not deal specifically with radio group ownership, since
the network study was directed toward television. Dean Barrow's study did
indicate, however, that "[tihe Congress and the Commission have histori-
cally placed major dependence upon competition as a regulator of radio
broadcasting, [and] the kind of competition that has developed appears to be
healthy."'
10 2
E. Position of Small Broadcasters
The position of small radio broadcasters regarding the FCC's Seven
Station Rule is unclear due to lack of available information. The best evi-
dence suggesting that small, independent broadcast licensees favor the Rule
is derived from a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) inter-office
memo. 10 3 The memo indicated that NAB had not become involved in the
FCC's multiple ownership hearings in Docket 8967 "because of the obvious
conflict in interest between those who are in a position to own a number of
stations and those who are not-in other words, large interests vs. small
97. Id. at 553-99.
98. Id. at 554.
99. Id. at 565-68.
100. Id. at 592.
101. Id. at 584-85.
102. Id. at 606.
103. National Association of Broadcasters Inter-Office Memo from Don Petty to Judge
Miller and A. D. Willard (Jan. 19, 1949).
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interests." 10 4
Other evidence suggesting that smaller broadcasters favor some type of
ownership limitation is shown by testimony of Edmund Craney, a small
market broadcaster with stations in Spokane, Washington, Portland, Ore-
gon, and in Butte, Helena, and Bozeman, Montana. 10 5 Craney stated that
although he was against a simplistic numeric limitation on station owner-
ship,10 6 he was in favor of the congressionally suggested twenty-five percent
of population limitation of ownership solution to the concentration prob-
lem. 10 7 He testified that his biggest fear was that in the absence of an upper
limit on ownership, all of the broadcasting stations in the country would
eventually come under government control. 108 "It is better to try something
than to sit still and do nothing. I do not have to tell you gentlemen that if
we in the industry remain blind, we will wake up one day facing an irresisti-
ble clamor for Government ownership or operation."' 0 9
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RETENTION OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE
The most extensive arguments against retention of the Seven Station
Rule were presented by Storer Broadcasting Company in its court challenge
of the Rule."10 Other parties opposed to the FCC Rule include the national
commercial broadcasting networks, group broadcasters, and minority opin-
ion at the FCC.
A. Position of Storer Broadcasting
Storer's general rationale for opposing the Seven Station Rule was
based on three grounds: "[T]he Commission failed completely 1) to make
any basic or ultimate factual findings or determinations, 2) to make any
attempt at rational conclusions based upon any factual considerations or
3) to state clearly the basis or reasons for establishment of the numerical
limits." ' 11
Storer contended that because Congress has never enacted any special
antimonopoly legislation applicable to broadcasting, the Seven Station Rule
was invalid. 1 2 Storer also suggested that the Rule violated the antitrust
laws because it "prevents a merger between two entities without regard to
the facts concerning the actual or potential effect of such acquisition on com-
petition.""' 3 Storer argued that the Rule could not be sustained because it
ignored the substantial differences between various broadcasting stations
104. Id.





110. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
111. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 36.
112. Id. at 22-25.
113. Id. at 23-24. Storer contended that the FCC had to evaluate: 1) the purpose of an
acquisition, 2) the existence, number, activity, and strength of competitors in the market ef-
fected by the acquisition, and 3) the size and location of the interest proposed to be acquired.
See United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948).
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with respect to geographical location, power, frequency, population served,
hours of operation, pattern of coverage, and protection from interference by
other stations. 14 Storer also attacked the Seven Station Rule as being arbi-
trary and capricious because it precludes consideration of whether a small
increase in nationwide station ownership by a single entity could be in the
public interest.'1 5
The Rule was challenged as bearing no relation to the Commission's
goal of diversification of program and service viewpoints because the rule
applies to stations serving wholly different areas. 1 6 Storer supported its po-
sition by pointing out that the Rule can exclude a multiple owner from oper-
ating a station in areas where there are more facilities than qualified
applicants, and where a multiple owner could bring an additional
viewpoint. 117
In summary, Storer argued that the Seven Station Rule was promul-
gated for administrative convenience and expedience," t8 rather than to fur-
ther the Congressional policy against monopoly or to advance the
Commission's principles of diversification.i 9 The broadcast group indi-
cated that the FCC failed to demonstrate that the numbers chosen bore "any
rational relationship to 'concentration of control' of broadcasting 'contrary
to the public interest, convenience or necessity.' ,,t20 Storer also contended
that the Commission had conducted no studies and had no experience to
support its inflexible numeric standard.' 2 ' Finally, Storer argued that the
right to obtain a hearing to waive the Seven Station Rule is "essentially
nugatory" because the applicant is faced with the nearly impossible task of
stating reasons why the arguably illogical rule does not apply to that multi-
ple owner.
122
B. Position of the Networks
Only two national networks filed comments in the FCC proceedings to
establish the Rule--Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National
Broadcasting System (NBC). However, some insight into the position of
other national networks is available from the 1947 Hearings on S. 1333.123
It appears that the position taken by CBS during the Commission's pro-
114. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 24-25.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 27.
117. Id. at 28.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. Storer also contended that it is highly doubtful that the FCC could establish ra-
tional arbitrary numeric limits on ownership since the Congress, the courts, and those agencies
charged with enforcing the antitrust laws have not found any generally applicable test of what
constitutes undue concentration in any situation. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 11,
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Supplemen-
tal Brief].
121. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 33-34.
122. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 19. Storer added that to obtain a waiver of
the Seven Station Rule, an applicant would have to assert negative reasons. This would be
difficult, however, because the Commission refused to air its affirmative reasons for promulgat-
ing the Rule.
123. See Hearings on S. 1333, supra note 87.
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mulgation of the Rule was one of resignation. Such resignation is apparent
in a letter from CBS President Frank Stanton, in which he requested the
national ownership limit be set at eight AM stations, eight FM stations, and
eight TV stations. 124 Although Stanton also forwarded CBS's opposition to
the proposed rules,' 2 5 CBS must have decided that the FCC was committed
to promulgating an arbitrary numeric limit on station ownership, regardless
of the industry's opposition. Consequently, the letter was a pragmatic, con-
ciliatory approach to attempt to obtain a higher arbitrary standard than the
one proposed by the Commission.1
2 6
NBC on the other hand, argued that no rules were needed. 12 7 NBC
stated that concentration of control questions should be decided on the facts
of each case, and that fixing a limit on ownership without regard to such
facts would be arbitrary. 28 NBC contended the FCC had no evidence that
mere accumulation of station licenses beyond a set figure resulted in a sti-
fling of competition or even a tendency in that direction.12 9 In 1947, NBC's
position was stated succinctly by its President Niles Trammel:
I cannot see any need or justification for a limit on the owner-
ship of broadcast stations, either by Commission action or by stat-
ute. The opportunity to serve the public should not be limited by
arbitrary restriction. The present radio law does not establish any
limitation on the ownership of stations beyond the requirements of
the antitrust laws. During all the years since the establishment of
broadcasting there has been no undue concentration of
ownership. 1
30
Two additional networks apparently opposed the Seven Station Rule
even though they failed to file comments during the Commission proceed-
ings. Mark Woods, President of the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC), indicated his company preferred an ad hoc approach to ownership
limits.
Therefore, if it is control of thought that is feared, or control of
political opinion, it cannot be eliminated in my opinion on any
arithmetical basis. My recommendation is that no limit as to the
number of stations be specified in the act and that the Commission
124. Letter of Frank Stanton, President of CBS, in Docket No. 8967 at 6-8 (Sept. 24, 1948).
125. Id.
126. CBS's real position regarding the Seven Station Rule would appear to be very close to
the position it took with respect to S. 1333. Dr. Stanton testified that:
There is no other field . . . that I know of in which the Government has set a fixed
ceiling on the size of an enterprise. Even the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
providing specific antitrust legislation in the utility field, does not set arbitrary limits
in terms of units, size or population. In the newspaper and magazine field there has
been no attempt by Congress or any Government agency to restrict growth by an
arbitrary standard. It is difficult to understand why broadcasting should be singled
out for special legislation of this unique type . . . I think that the normal antitrust
provisions should prevail if there is monopoly.
Hearings on S. 1333, supra note 87, at 327.
127. See Comments of National Broadcasting Company in Docket No. 8967 at 18-25 (Sept.
27, 1948).
128. Id. at 20. NBC suggested there was no reasonable basis for the assertion that the con-
trol of 5, 10, or 20 stations would automatically create an undue concentration of control.
129. Id.
130. See Hearings on S. 1333, supra note 87, at 426.
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fix no limit which would prevent it from deciding each application
on its own merits in the public interest.
1 3'
A different approach was advanced by the Mutual Broadcasting System
to legislatively limit the Commission's power to deal with concentration of
control issues in broadcasting.
Instead of the indefinite provision on multiple-ownership in the
White Bill or the arbitrary standard presently enforced by the
Commission, I should prefer to have Congress confer, in some ap-
propriately limited fashion, the power upon the Commission to
consider the question of the tendency toward monopolization in
connection with applications by multiple-station owners for au-
thorization to erect additional stations or to acquire existing
stations. 132
The national networks appear to have been unanimously opposed to
the promulgation of the Seven Station Rule.13 3 In addition, the networks
supported an ad hoc approach for dealing with concentration of ownership
issues in broadcasting, in contrast to the arbitrary Rule approach.
C. Position of Group Broadcasters
The most extensive comments available in the FCC Rule proceedings
were filed by Trans-American Television Corporation, Salt Lake City
Broadcasting Co., Universal Broadcasting Co., and KMMJ, Inc.134 These
broadcasters were opposed to the Seven Station Rule because they argued
that it would cause denial of applications in situations where the evil with
which the Commission was concerned, concentration of control, did not in
fact exist. 135 Consequently, they also favored a case-by-case approach in
dealing with concentration of control issues. 1 36 The Rule was challenged as
unnecessary because "the day may not be far removed when there is no
longer a real scarcity of broadcasting facilities."' 1 37 Finally, the four broad-
cast groups argued that the proposed Rule was arbitrary and capricious be-
cause it failed to consider many relevant concentration of control factors,
such as geographical location and population served. '
38
Another broadcaster position was expressed by J.N. Bailey, Executive
Director of FM Association:1
3 9
[W]e feel that the Commission should promulgate no ironclad rule,
but rather should handle FM station distribution in the manner in
which AM stations are licensed. An occasion might arise whereby
one large corporation operating stations profitably in six metropoli-
131. Id. at 281.
132. Id. at 358.
133. This position is based on the contention that CBS's true position was revealed in its
testimony regarding S. 1333 in 1947.
134. See Statement on Proposal to Amend the Multiple Ownership Rules in Docket No.
8967 at 27-45 (Sept. 27, 1948).
135. Id. at 31. It was suggested that such uncalled for denials rendered the Rule unreasona-
ble and an improper exercise of Commission discretion and power.
136. Id. at 34.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. at 44.
139. See Hearings on S 1333, supra note 87, at 202-10.
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tan markets, could give service to some smaller unprofitable market
or two, whereas such small markets could not support an independ-
ent station. 140
Mr. Bailey's association obviously favored utilization of a case-by-case ap-
proach in dealing with multiple ownership in specific market areas.
Finally, growth-oriented group broadcasters opposed the Seven Station
Rule as a limitation of their long-term investment opportunities in the
broadcasting industry.
D. Minorzt FCC Posztons
Although the majority FCC sentiment at the time the Seven Station
Rule was established favored the Rule, various Commissioners expressed res-
ervations concerning the adoption of arbitrary numeric limits. Commis-
sioner Doerfer indicated that:
I am constrained to record my misgivings about linking a nu-
merical evaluation of stations with "undue concentration of owner-
ship" as an unfailing guide as to what is in the public interest ...
I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of picking a "number"
without more reliable and persuasive evidence that the number
chosen will in all cases mark the upper limits of what will safeguard
the public interest .... 141
Doerfer concluded that there was not much more than "intuition" as the
Commission's basis for the present rule.1
42
Commissioner Jett explained he was philosophically opposed to imposi-
tion of arbitrary national ownership limits because no concentration existed,
and regional concentration potentially presented a much worse problem
than did national concentration. In addition, he argued that station power,
dial position, and geography created large audience coverage discrepancies
among radio stations.
143
I am opposed to any restriction which specifies a particular ceiling
for the reasons given above, and in particular, the fact that engi-
neering considerations may make it desirable to permit more sta-
tions to be owned in certain power and frequency categories than
in the lower portion of the band.
144
Another Commissioner who expressed doubts regarding the Commis-
sion's ability to establish a workable "rule of thumb" was Chairman Charles
Denny. He indicated he did not have any form~ula, but did not agree that
the present draft of S. 1333 contained the correct formula. Denny concluded
he did not know whether such a formula could be devised.' 45 As early as
140. Id. at 208.
141. See Report and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797, 2804 (1954). Commis-
sioner Doerfer actually concurred with the FCC's decision to allow entrepreneurs to own two
additional TV stations (more than the five station limit) as long as both were UHFs. However,
he obviously was less than enthusiastic in that support.
142. Id.
143. &e Harzngs on S1333, supra note 87, at 65.
144. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 45.
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June 1947, Chairman Denny indicated that the Commission's national own-
ership rules were open to question.
I do not think we have by any means devised a perfect rule when
we say that one person shall not own more than six FM stations
and shall not own more than five television stations. It is a tenta-
tive rule at the moment. Anyone who comes in 'and shows good
reasons for changing it, up or down, will be given consideration. 1
46
Finally, although Commissioner Hennock favored the Seven Station
Rule, she expressed the opinion that regional concentration of ownership
"may often have a more deleterious effect on competition. . . than the own-




As technology has allowed for an ever increasing number of radio chan-
nels, the scarcity premise, on which traditional government regulation has
rested, is becoming less tenable.' 4  Recent FCC actions have been directed
toward an almost total deregulation of the cable industry. 149 In addition,
the FCC has proposed to allow for the development of direct broadcast satel-
lite services' 50 and movement into the low power TV area. 15 1 The Commis-
sion's actions are aimed at minimizing the "scarcity" of communication
channels receivable in the average American home.
The future of the FCC's Seven Station and Duopoly Rules (limitation
on ownership within a market) in such a changing environment has been
questioned by the NAB.
[The Satellite Television Corp.] asks the Commission to give it
something no other broadcaster is permitted to have-multiple
broadcast channels in every market in the country. [NAB] has
strongly urged that all ownership restrictions be removed from
broadcast television, cable and [satellite] TV. If this is done, then
NAB believes that [Direct Broadcast Satellite] operators should
also be free of such restrictions.
5 2
The NAB argues that as long as the Commission applies the multiple owner-
ship rules to current, terrestrial broadcasters, the rules must apply evenhand-
edly to all broadcasters. The Commission's need for any type of regulation
146. Id. at 70.
147. Set Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 299 (1953).
148. See B. OWEN, supra note 41, at 106-07. Owen suggests that the spectrum is not in
"scarce supply" to any greater extent than steel, plastic, or pencils.
149. Seegenerally Order in Docket No. 21284, 67 F.C.C.2d 262 (1978). Additionally, great
expansion in the area of cable radio is likely to occur within the next five to ten years.
150. See Memorandum Opinion and Order in General Docket No. 80-603, 88 F.C.C.2d 1
(1981). See also Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking in General Docket No.
80-603, FCC 81-181, 46 Fed. Reg. 30124 (1981) (to be codified in 47 CFR §§ 2, 23, 94) [herein-
after cited as DBS Noice].
151. See Inquiry Into the Future of Low-Power Television Broadcasting and Television
Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,178 (1980) (to be
codified in 47 CFR § 73).
152. See National Association of Broadcasters' Petition to Deny, In re Application of Satel-
lite Television Corporation in General Docket No. 80-603 at 64-65 (July 16, 1981).
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in radio has been greatly decreased by the great expansion of other competi-
tive outlets. 
153
The divergent views that have been expressed concerning the Seven
Station Rule illustrate the need to formulate policy alternatives that should
be considered by the Commission in determining the future of the Rule.
The following section is this author's outline of seven policy alternatives.
The alternatives will then be discussed and analyzed, with the conclusion
that Alternative 3 should be adopted.
VI. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The policy alternatives available to the Commission in dealing with the
Seven Station Rule are:
1. Leave the standard as is, limiting national ownership to seven
AM stations and seven FM stations.
2. Modify the standard to allow for the ownership of fourteen ra-
dio stations on a nationwide basis without regard to station
type (AM, FM).
3. Modify the standard to allow one entity to own the same per-
centage of stations nationally in 1982 as they were allowed to
do when the Rule was promulgated in 1953. This would allow
for the owneiship of thirty-six radio stations nationally regard-
less of station type.
1 54
4. Modify the standard to allow one entity to own the same per-
centage of radio stations nationally as television stations.
Adoption of this approach would allow for ownership of sev-
enty-two radio stations on a national basis. 5
5. Eliminate all arbitrary standards (Seven Station Rule) with re-
spect to national concentration in the radio broadcast industry.
This would allow an ad hoc determination as to whether an
expanding radio station group's newest purchase is in the pub-
lic interest.
6. Utilize the merger guidelines provided by the Justice Depart-
ment to determine when a radio station merger would not be
in the public interest. 156
7. Limit national radio station ownership with a population stan-
dard similar to the ones proposed by Senators White and
Bricker that establishes a constraint on a single entity's owner-
153. Set generally Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, In the Matter of
Deregulation of Radio in Docket No. 79-219 at 17, 21, 22, 30, 31 (Mar. 25, 1980); Reply Com-
ments of the National Association of Broadcasters, In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio in
Docket No. 79-219 at 28, 56, 57 (June 25, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Reply Comments].
154. In 1953, there were 3,032 licensed radio station in operation. Since one entity could
own 14 of these stations (seven AMs and seven FMs), one entrepreneur could have legally con-
trolled .46% of all commercial radio stations nationally. BROADCASTING, Dec. 1953. Today
(1982) there are 7,937 licensed radio stations in operation. Control of .46% of all commercial
radio stations in operation in 1982 translates into 36 stations nationwide.
155. One entity is allowed to control seven TV stations nationally. Today there are 763
licensed commercial television stations in operation. Consequently, one entrepreneur can own
.917% of the operational commercial TV stations. If radio entrepreneurs were allowed to con-
trol .917% of the commercial radio stations in operation, they would be allowed to own 72
stations nationwide.
156. See inf:a note 160.
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ship by the percentage of United States population that the
stations' signals can reach. The upper limit proposed by White
and Bricker was twenty-five percent.
VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has focused on whether the Seven Station Rule still repre-
sents a valid approach to regulating the radio industry. In this author's
opinion, the Seven Station Rule as it now stands (Alternative 1) needs to be
modified to minimize unnecessary FCC intrusion into the investment deci-
sions of radio broadcasters. As the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
indicated in Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC,t 5 7 "the Commission should go no
further than is reasonably necessary to correct the evil .. ,"158 The di-
lemma is to determine where to draw the line between "necessary" and "un-
necessary" FCC action. The policy concern behind FCC action is with
national concentration in the radio broadcasting industry, and therefore,
"necessary" FCC action would promote competition. However, the great
increase in the number of operating stations, and therefore competition,
since 1953 when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, suggests that con-
cerns about "monopoly" and "diversification" in the radio industry must be
considerably less significant today.' 59 The FCC recently recognized these
great changes in the radio industry and instituted some deregulation.
As we stated in the Notice, it is our concern that regulation should be
kept relevant to technology and an indust that has been characterizedfrom its
beginning by rapid and dynamic change. In less than fifty years, broad-
cast radio has grown from an infancy of 583 stations in 1934 to a
maturity of nearly 9000 [commercial and noncommercial] stations
today. . . . [P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early
days of radio may not be necessary in an environment where
thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts of programming and ap-
peal to all manner of segmented audiences. We believe, therefore, that
the Commission is justifted in reviewing its regulations in the face of such
Jfndamental changes as have occurred since the dawn of radio regulation in
this county. Indeed, failure to do so could constitute less than ade-
quate performance of our regulatory mission.i60
Evaluation of the FCC's rationale for establishing the Seven Station
Rule in light of changed conditions suggests that the Rule limits national
ownership of radio stations far beyond anything envisioned in the antitrust
laws. 161 The Rule may in fact have resulted in less diversity of viewpoints at
the national level than would have been present under a less restrictive stan-
157. 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
158. Id. at 248.
159. Ste Loevinger, Media Concenratior MyAth adReality, 24 ANTrrRUST BULL. 479, 484-93
(1979); Media Contenirain, supra note 58, at 417-19, 426; see also supra Tables I through 5.
160. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 0,
73) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation of Radio] (emphasis added).
161. Baker, supra note 94, at 653, indicates that the Seven Station Rule goes further to
promote diversity of control than "antitrust would dictate, or could dictate." The best informa-
tion regarding the Justice Department's definition of what constitutes an anticompetitive
merger is found in Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4430
(1968).
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dard.16 2 This argument is based on the premise that the economies of scale
that are present in group-ownership situations will allow diversity in radio
station programs. It is economically more feasible for a group owner to offer
less profitable radio programs with smaller audiences than an owner of a
single radio station. Some increase in the present fourteen station limit on
radio ownership would arguably not create a negative impact on competi-
tion or diversity in the current radio industry.1 63  However, that increase
must be reasonable. Alternative 3, which retains the same national percent-
age as existed when the Rule was promulgated, appears to be a reasonable
increase.
The large increase in radio station competitors on a national basis ren-
ders most of the other arguments forwarded by the Commission for the Rule
moot. Specifically, it is difficult to understand how one could characterize
AM and FM radio frequencies as particularly "scarce" in today's market
environment.164 Similarly, the media power rationale for regulating radio is
not as strong an argument today as it was in 1953 due to the substantial
increase in the number of radio stations.1
65
In addition, the argument that the Seven Station Rule (Alternative 1) is
needed to protect small broadcasters from the bargaining advantages pos-
sessed by station groups appears to be weak in view of the changes in the
radio industry. This argument is concerned with the fear that ownership of
more than fourteen radio stations nationally will confer an excessive amount
of market power on a group owner.' 66 Ownership of more than fourteen
stations in geographically dispersed markets throughout the United States
could not be expected to confer excessive amounts of market power on a
In a market in which the shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately
75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms ac-
counting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
[If the] shares of the four largest firms amount to less than approximately 75%, merg-
ers are challenged along the following lines:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
Id.
162. This is suggested by Parkman, An &conomic Analysir of the FCC's Multtpe Ownership Rules,
31 AD. L. REv. 205, 217-20 (1979).
163. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 417-19, 426; Rosse, supra note 5, at 188. The
primary issues regarding concentration are with respect to national competition. The FCC has
rules in place to deal with regional concentration and with local competition. Additionally,
even if the Commission set its ownership limits too high in this area, the public interest of
preventing monopolies and undue concentration would still be protected by the antitrust laws.
164. See B. OWEN, supra note 41, at 106-07; Loevinger, supra note 159.
165. Set Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160, at 13,893; Media Concentration, supra note 58,
at 417-19, 426.
166. See supra note 67.
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radio station group. 16 7 Inasmuch as the average radio station in this country
faces tremendous competition not only from other radio stations but also
from television stations, daily newspapers, cable television, and radio station
groups that are considerably larger than those presently allowed could not
be expected to either possess or exercise market power in the national media
market. '6
The FCC's final substantive rationale for the Seven Station Rule (Alter-
native 1), that utilization of an arbitrary upper limit on ownership is a fairer,
more efficient procedure than an ad hoc approach, is arguably the primary
intent behind the Commission's promulgation of the Rule.169 The regula-
tory efficiency of establishing an arbitrary upper limit on national radio sta-
tion ownership with which to evaluate prospective licensees cannot be
disputed.' 7 0 On the other hand, the fairness of the procedure depends on
where the limit is set. 17 1 The substantial increase in the number of radio
stations nationally would suggest that conditions have changed such that the
present arbitrary limits can be safely liberalized. 1
72
The rationale provided by other parties in support of some type of fixed
upper limit on national ownership of radio stations does not differ substan-
tially from those provided by the FCC. Congress, the Justice Department,
and Dean Barrow all express the fear that failure to limit the number of
broadcasting stations that can be controlled by one entity nationally will
lead to concentration of control, which runs counter to the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. 173 These concerns are unfounded in light of the
substantial increase and changes in the American commercial radio
industry. t74
The opponents of the Seven Station Rule argue that the Rule is arbi-
trary because: 1) it ignores all of the facts relevant to determining if owner-
ship of more than fourteen radio stations nationally is in the public
interest, 175 and 2) the Rule was promulgated for administrative convenience
and expedience rather than to promote competition and diversification. 1
76
Both contentions have merit. However, dealing with national concentration
167. Id See also Media Concentration, supra note 58 at 417, 424-25; supra note 72 and accompa-
nying text.
168. See supra note 72; Loevinger, supra note 159; Reply Comments, supra note 153, at 28, 56,
57. Also note the relatively low profitability experienced by the average radio station in supra
notes 68 and 69 and accompanying text.
169. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
170. Clearly defined limits of this sort save large amounts of time and money for both the
FCC and for broadcasters. Conversely, a case-by-case approach would necessarily involve the
Commission in lengthy hearings whenever this issue is raised.
171. Setting a limit which is too low leads to an unnecessary restriction on entrepreneurs. If
no "evil" would occur under a higher limit, society is being protected from an imaginary nega-
tive force. Conversely, if the limit is too liberal, anticompetitive practices might result. The
antitrust laws set the line for the average business in this country with respect to national con-
centration. See Baker, supra note 94, at 653; Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
172. See Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
173. See the comments made by these parties, supra notes 86-93.
174. See Network Broadcaxting, supra note 96, at 606; authorities cited supra note 167; and
Martin, supra note 67.
175. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 23-25.
176. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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issues on a case-by-case basis could be an expensive and time-consuming pro-
cess. 177 Setting an upper limit on the number of radio stations that can be
controlled by one entity may be the most efficient method of dealing with
national concentration of ownership. 178 However, the manner in which the
Commission set the upper limit on ownership was totally arbitrary. 179 At a
minimum, the Commission should have been more explicit with respect to
how it arrived at the upper limits selected. 180 Failure to do so has made
obtaining a waiver of the Rule functionally impossible.'" Consequently,
the best approach would be to establish realistic and fair national ownership
limits that can be waived upon proper showing.' 82 Alternative 3 offers a
realistic and fair national ownership limit, while retaining the efficiency of
having a maximum limit on ownership.
Policy alternatives 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, outlined above, should be rejected
for a variety of reasons. Policy Alternatives 1 and 2 are rejected as being
unnecessarily restrictive with respect to private investment decisions. As pre-
viously discussed, failure to make some modification in the Seven Station
Rule based on the extensive changes that have taken place in the radio in-
dustry would not be in the public interest.183 Policy Alternative 4 is rejected
only because it would allow for too large an increase in national radio station
ownership without prior Commission experience.' 84 After the Commission
has had some experience with expanded national radio station ownership it
will be in a better position to evaluate whether further general expansion
would be consistent with the public interest. 185 Adoption of policy Alterna-
tives 5 and 6, outlined above, would be very desirable. The Commission
could not be accused of abrogating its duty regarding national concentration
issues by taking a traditional antitrust approach to the problem.' 86 How-
ever, adoption of this approach would create a high degree of uncertainty
among broadcasters and at the Commission. Such antitrust considerations
should certainly become relevant if, and when, a broadcast group petitions
177. It is difficult to estimate the costs of this type of litigation for both the Commission and
the private parties involved. See Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations,
37 R.R. 2d 1679, 1686-87 (1976), for the Commission's estimate of the costs involved in the
proceedings of Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
178. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
179. Se the exchange between Wayne Coy, then Chairman of the FCC and Paul O'Bryan
in Oral Arguments in Docket No. 8967, 182 (Jan. 17, 1949).
180. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 11. See also supra notes 50-53 and accompa-
nying text.
181. The fear expressed by Storer in its Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 19, turned
out to be well founded since the Commission has never waived the Seven Station Rule. See
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C.2d 832, 834 (1977).
182. Set United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
183. Id See supra notes 67 and 159.
184. The Commission's lack of experience in increased radio ownership is apparent from the
fact that the Seven Station Rule has remained intact since 1953.
185. The slower expansion envisioned in the thirty-six-station approach is more consistent
with the operational definition of "reasonable" provided for in supra note 32, than the seventy-
two-station approach.
186. See generally Celler, supra note 89; Mahaffie, Mergers and Diversification in the Newspaper,
Broadcasting and Information Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 927 (1968); and Barrow, Antitrust and
the Regulated Inusty: Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DUKE LJ. 282.
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the FCC to waive its national ownership rule.' 8 7 However, administrative
efficiency considerations weigh heavily against the adoption of a case-by-case
approach, and thus, these alternatives are rejected.188 Finally, limiting na-
tional ownership by utilization of the percentage of population approach
suggested in Policy Alternative 7, above, would be very difficult to adminis-
ter. 18 9 The most bizarre problem that could occur under a population ap-
proach is that a station group that was within the population guideline when
it was formed could result in a violation of the rule if extensive growth oc-
curred in the markets covered by the group.
FCC adoption of policy Alternative 3, as outlined above, would repre-
sent a realistic and fair solution to the problem at hand. This approach is
compelling for two reasons. First, the radio industry is extremely competi-
tive both nationally and locally. Allowing one entrepreneur to own the same
percentage of the nearly 8,000 operating commercial radio stations as was
allowed in 1953 cannot possibly create unlawful concentration in the na-
tional media market. 19° Second, this approach will maintain an efficient
method for dealing with national media concentration issues. 19 1
Additionally, it is recommended that the FCC not view this new stan-
dard as unwaivable. 19 2 The selection of any numeric national ownership
standard is necessarily arbitrary.' 93 Failure to waive what is admittedly an
arbitrary standard is the ultimate in administrative inflexibility, particularly
in a dynamic marketplace.
194
In sum, the FCC must reexamine its Seven Station Rule. As the
Supreme Court opinion in Storer Broadcasting noted: "If time and changing
circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by application of
the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accord-
ance with its statutory obligations."' 95 Circumstances have clearly changed
in the radio industry. Increasing the upper limit on national radio station
ownership from fourteen to thirty-six, as outlined in Alternative 3 above,
would be consistent with the radio deregulation already instituted by the
Commission. 196 The time has finally come for the FCC to modify its "ulti-
mate multiple ownership regulation."'
19 7
187. The guidelines provided in supra note 161, would undoubtedly become relevant to any
petition to waive the Commission's national ownership rule.
188. Seesupra note 177.
189. See the comments of FCC Chairman Denny in Hearngs on S 1333, supra note 87, at 62-
65, and the comments of Commissioner Jett at 65-66.
190. See supra notes 67-69, and 159.
191. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
192. See Supplemental Brief supra note 120, at 19; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
193. See supra notes 178 and 179 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
195. 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
196. See Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
197. See Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C.2d 832,
834 (1977).
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